Posted: Sun Mar 09, 2008 3:05 pm
It's been a long while since my last update. I've started writing three times, and stopped myself three times.
I did some reviewing and realized that I generally write in three veins; the personal, the political, and the philosophic. Unfortunately, for those who were expecting a personal update, telling folks how I'm doing and what's going on, well, all I can say is that there have been so many changes in my life recently (both here and back home) that I can't keep up. Plus, there's an elephant in the room I absolutely must address... Three suicide bombs in three days. Over a hundred civilians dead. Some in Canada have again sounded a call to retreat. What are we doing here in Afghanistan?
This is a valid question, and one that I’ve devoted a lot of time to considering. Most of the guys here think about this a lot, too. There is a common misconception amongst some civilians that NATO soldiers (particularly American, but Canadian and European as well) are either mindless robots who don’t question their orders, naïve jingoists, unfortunate dupes, right-wing ideologues, religious nuts or money-grubbing opportunists. That’s not the case at all.
While I can’t speak for Iraq, the general consensus amongst the soldiers I know from various nationalities is that we came to Afghanistan for one reason, but are staying for another. Ultimately, the rationale in both cases are argued both for and against in two dimensions; the pragmatic versus the principled. So, let’s break this down…
We came here to oust the Taliban and rout Al Qaeda; what were our reasons? Well, as far as the principled / moral reasons go, the Taliban were a thoroughly shit regime that treated the Afghans like dogs (and their women and girls as worse than dogs). It was incumbent on us to do something, and some believe that it was a critical failing on our part that we did not act sooner.
With this in mind, critics may lament that if we actually cared about the morality of the issue, we would have acted sooner, or we would also engage in morally based intervention elsewhere. However, there are tens of thousands of moral outrages unaddressed on our planet, and we cannot rectify them all; there are limits to the power of the Western states. The way we can pare these crises and injustices down is to try to address issues that present a pragmatic benefit to us, but prioritize them and address only the ones that pass a moral filter (commonly defined in Thomas Aquinas’ conception of Jus Ad Bellam).
So our pragmatic reasons? Of these there are many, but I consider one to be of primordial importance; after 9/11 we were compelled to prove the terrible consequences of attacking a NATO nation. To fail to do so would have encouraged future attacks. This was a fundamental threat to future deterrence. Thus, this overwhelming pragmatic compulsion to act brought a long-simmering moral issue to the fore.
There were legitimate moral arguments against our intervention, but the question is whether our pragmatic and principled justifications to intervene overrode the moral arguments against acting. What right did we have to invade the sovereignty of another nation when it was non-state actors that provoked our action? What would be the human cost of our invasion in terms of collateral damage? Ultimately, I think that by deterring future attacks on the West and disrupting the organization that blew up embassies in Africa as well as office buildings in the United States, we saved more lives in the long run.
So, that’s the invasion in a nutshell. We could have sat back and exclaimed that we were done, that we had met our requirements, but now we have done so, we have another kettle of fish; why are we still here then? Once we have removed a regime from power, what is our moral responsibility to shepherd that society through the chaos that will inevitably follow? We shattered the institutions of government in this country, and to do nothing to avert complete chaos in a power vacuum would be the height of immorality.
(As an aside, for most opposed to our mission, their criticism of our initial invasion was that it was wrong to attack; a moral argument. Despite this, their opposition to our current mission is that it is futile, that it is impossible to succeed; a pragmatic argument. This is some impressive intellectual gymnastics to twist one's position so thoroughly.)
Our pragmatic reasons however, are at this point generally not brought up in any debate that I have seen back in Canada; and this is the crux of what I see as the problem in the dialog amongst our parliamentarians and pundits; nobody is debating the rational, clinically cold benefits versus the costs of staying here and fighting on. The debate is fraught with morality-based arguments (and accusations). But nobody is really debating the realpolitik of what we're doing here, and it's greater strategic impact on the globe.
Most of the anti-war crowd have currently attached themselves to a limited pragmatic argument; that no matter how moral our continuing presence may or may not be, they claim that it is not practical to stay here as we have no chance of success and that the expense in terms of money or Canadian lives is not worth any possible benefit.
Most soldiers I know feel that we have a realistic chance of success, even when constrained to fight in a moral manner (in general accordance with Aquinas’ conception of Jus In Bello), even though our enemies are under no such constraints. As I’ve written extensively on that subject before, I won’t get into it again. However, we as a society have have not investigated that benefit of our action in practical terms, and less so the heavy costs of not continuing to support the people of Afghanistan.
We are at a turning point in History. There is a fundamental development underway that is larger than the growth of Islamic radicalism. Right now, the West has what is probably our absolute last chance to prove decisively that insurgency can be defeated. This again speaks to deterrence, and our actions in the next couple of years will determine the future trends of world conflict.
There are examples of successful counter-insurgency; The British successes in Malaysia and Oman stand out as some examples, but they are fading in memory. Today, insurgency and terrorism is seen as a very viable tactic; one that with enough patience will inevitably win against any technically or numerically superior foe. Afghanistan is probably the closest we have come since Malaysia or Oman to a successful counter-insurgency campaign, rooted in development of governance, infrastructure, education, reconstruction and combat. To put it bluntly, the Taliban are broken and barely hanging on, fractured with infighting and lashing out in desperate attacks against civilians, further separating them from any potential base of popular support.
Today, we are at the cusp of deterring insurgencies across the globe; And it’s not just Islamic radicalism that is watching us… The FARC in Columbia, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and other non-muslim insurgencies are paying close attention to the strategy, tactics, and fortunes of our action in Afghanistan. Doing likewse are the tribal militias in Kenya, the Janjaweed in Sudan, and any number of villains with an AK-47, some explosives and a nihilistic ideology. Further, they are looking closely at the people’s and government’s resolve within all NATO nations.
Ultimately, what will be the course of history from this point? Will we validate insurgency as a viable tactic by quitting now, despite the fact that the insurgency here in Afghanistan is virtually crippled and sustained only on the hope that we in the West lose interest? Or will we be able to deter insurgencies across the globe in the future, preventing even more bloodshed in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa? What about the growing radicalism (both of the right wing fascist and jihadist varities) in Europe; what will they think of our failure to show resolve in the face of such a test? Do they smell an opportunity? What will they think about the validity of using violence to achieve their political objectives? What about the few violent or lawless aboriginal bands or groups in Canada and the United States? Will they graduate to a higher form of “resistance” than roadblocks and land occupation?
Are we willing to run from Afghanistan only to encourage an insurgency in Canada?
The West has made mistakes in our history. I am very quick to admit that. We have caused a great deal of suffering in the world, but honestly no less than any other great civilization... But we have much more to be proud of. We created the concepts of personal liberty, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and the free market. We facilitated the return of democracy to the modern age, dramatically lengthened the human lifespan across the globe, pushed the boundaries of science, and created mass communication. Of all civilizations across the globe, we best demonstrate meritocracy and have the least corrupt governance. Our society was the first of the great civilizations to concieve of and implement female emancipation, abolition of slavery, and the notion that all races are equal.
Of course we have a long way to go, but at least we are on that journey; The civilizations with which we compete are not even there yet. Only where we can exert a positive influence can conditions improve.
Unfortunately, Western influence on global affairs is fragile. If we cannot demonstrate capability and resolve, even when we have both the moral high-ground and the pragmatic motivation to succeed, we invalidate our entire value system... And we will not only lose Afghanistan, we will also lose the 21st century to global chaos.
So, back to Kandahar; most of the soldiers I know understand what's at stake in our fight. Maybe they all haven't verbalized it to the same degree as I just have, but there is a general perception that Canadians don't quite realize just how much is at stake. We fear that they will throw away our gains and sacrifice our future security for immediate comfort and smug self-righteousness. To be honest, that fickleness scares the hell out of us more than the Taliban do.
[edited to rectify some grammar and consolidate two paragraphs that I about before posting]
I did some reviewing and realized that I generally write in three veins; the personal, the political, and the philosophic. Unfortunately, for those who were expecting a personal update, telling folks how I'm doing and what's going on, well, all I can say is that there have been so many changes in my life recently (both here and back home) that I can't keep up. Plus, there's an elephant in the room I absolutely must address... Three suicide bombs in three days. Over a hundred civilians dead. Some in Canada have again sounded a call to retreat. What are we doing here in Afghanistan?
This is a valid question, and one that I’ve devoted a lot of time to considering. Most of the guys here think about this a lot, too. There is a common misconception amongst some civilians that NATO soldiers (particularly American, but Canadian and European as well) are either mindless robots who don’t question their orders, naïve jingoists, unfortunate dupes, right-wing ideologues, religious nuts or money-grubbing opportunists. That’s not the case at all.
While I can’t speak for Iraq, the general consensus amongst the soldiers I know from various nationalities is that we came to Afghanistan for one reason, but are staying for another. Ultimately, the rationale in both cases are argued both for and against in two dimensions; the pragmatic versus the principled. So, let’s break this down…
We came here to oust the Taliban and rout Al Qaeda; what were our reasons? Well, as far as the principled / moral reasons go, the Taliban were a thoroughly shit regime that treated the Afghans like dogs (and their women and girls as worse than dogs). It was incumbent on us to do something, and some believe that it was a critical failing on our part that we did not act sooner.
With this in mind, critics may lament that if we actually cared about the morality of the issue, we would have acted sooner, or we would also engage in morally based intervention elsewhere. However, there are tens of thousands of moral outrages unaddressed on our planet, and we cannot rectify them all; there are limits to the power of the Western states. The way we can pare these crises and injustices down is to try to address issues that present a pragmatic benefit to us, but prioritize them and address only the ones that pass a moral filter (commonly defined in Thomas Aquinas’ conception of Jus Ad Bellam).
So our pragmatic reasons? Of these there are many, but I consider one to be of primordial importance; after 9/11 we were compelled to prove the terrible consequences of attacking a NATO nation. To fail to do so would have encouraged future attacks. This was a fundamental threat to future deterrence. Thus, this overwhelming pragmatic compulsion to act brought a long-simmering moral issue to the fore.
There were legitimate moral arguments against our intervention, but the question is whether our pragmatic and principled justifications to intervene overrode the moral arguments against acting. What right did we have to invade the sovereignty of another nation when it was non-state actors that provoked our action? What would be the human cost of our invasion in terms of collateral damage? Ultimately, I think that by deterring future attacks on the West and disrupting the organization that blew up embassies in Africa as well as office buildings in the United States, we saved more lives in the long run.
So, that’s the invasion in a nutshell. We could have sat back and exclaimed that we were done, that we had met our requirements, but now we have done so, we have another kettle of fish; why are we still here then? Once we have removed a regime from power, what is our moral responsibility to shepherd that society through the chaos that will inevitably follow? We shattered the institutions of government in this country, and to do nothing to avert complete chaos in a power vacuum would be the height of immorality.
(As an aside, for most opposed to our mission, their criticism of our initial invasion was that it was wrong to attack; a moral argument. Despite this, their opposition to our current mission is that it is futile, that it is impossible to succeed; a pragmatic argument. This is some impressive intellectual gymnastics to twist one's position so thoroughly.)
Our pragmatic reasons however, are at this point generally not brought up in any debate that I have seen back in Canada; and this is the crux of what I see as the problem in the dialog amongst our parliamentarians and pundits; nobody is debating the rational, clinically cold benefits versus the costs of staying here and fighting on. The debate is fraught with morality-based arguments (and accusations). But nobody is really debating the realpolitik of what we're doing here, and it's greater strategic impact on the globe.
Most of the anti-war crowd have currently attached themselves to a limited pragmatic argument; that no matter how moral our continuing presence may or may not be, they claim that it is not practical to stay here as we have no chance of success and that the expense in terms of money or Canadian lives is not worth any possible benefit.
Most soldiers I know feel that we have a realistic chance of success, even when constrained to fight in a moral manner (in general accordance with Aquinas’ conception of Jus In Bello), even though our enemies are under no such constraints. As I’ve written extensively on that subject before, I won’t get into it again. However, we as a society have have not investigated that benefit of our action in practical terms, and less so the heavy costs of not continuing to support the people of Afghanistan.
We are at a turning point in History. There is a fundamental development underway that is larger than the growth of Islamic radicalism. Right now, the West has what is probably our absolute last chance to prove decisively that insurgency can be defeated. This again speaks to deterrence, and our actions in the next couple of years will determine the future trends of world conflict.
There are examples of successful counter-insurgency; The British successes in Malaysia and Oman stand out as some examples, but they are fading in memory. Today, insurgency and terrorism is seen as a very viable tactic; one that with enough patience will inevitably win against any technically or numerically superior foe. Afghanistan is probably the closest we have come since Malaysia or Oman to a successful counter-insurgency campaign, rooted in development of governance, infrastructure, education, reconstruction and combat. To put it bluntly, the Taliban are broken and barely hanging on, fractured with infighting and lashing out in desperate attacks against civilians, further separating them from any potential base of popular support.
Today, we are at the cusp of deterring insurgencies across the globe; And it’s not just Islamic radicalism that is watching us… The FARC in Columbia, Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and other non-muslim insurgencies are paying close attention to the strategy, tactics, and fortunes of our action in Afghanistan. Doing likewse are the tribal militias in Kenya, the Janjaweed in Sudan, and any number of villains with an AK-47, some explosives and a nihilistic ideology. Further, they are looking closely at the people’s and government’s resolve within all NATO nations.
Ultimately, what will be the course of history from this point? Will we validate insurgency as a viable tactic by quitting now, despite the fact that the insurgency here in Afghanistan is virtually crippled and sustained only on the hope that we in the West lose interest? Or will we be able to deter insurgencies across the globe in the future, preventing even more bloodshed in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and Africa? What about the growing radicalism (both of the right wing fascist and jihadist varities) in Europe; what will they think of our failure to show resolve in the face of such a test? Do they smell an opportunity? What will they think about the validity of using violence to achieve their political objectives? What about the few violent or lawless aboriginal bands or groups in Canada and the United States? Will they graduate to a higher form of “resistance” than roadblocks and land occupation?
Are we willing to run from Afghanistan only to encourage an insurgency in Canada?
The West has made mistakes in our history. I am very quick to admit that. We have caused a great deal of suffering in the world, but honestly no less than any other great civilization... But we have much more to be proud of. We created the concepts of personal liberty, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, and the free market. We facilitated the return of democracy to the modern age, dramatically lengthened the human lifespan across the globe, pushed the boundaries of science, and created mass communication. Of all civilizations across the globe, we best demonstrate meritocracy and have the least corrupt governance. Our society was the first of the great civilizations to concieve of and implement female emancipation, abolition of slavery, and the notion that all races are equal.
Of course we have a long way to go, but at least we are on that journey; The civilizations with which we compete are not even there yet. Only where we can exert a positive influence can conditions improve.
Unfortunately, Western influence on global affairs is fragile. If we cannot demonstrate capability and resolve, even when we have both the moral high-ground and the pragmatic motivation to succeed, we invalidate our entire value system... And we will not only lose Afghanistan, we will also lose the 21st century to global chaos.
So, back to Kandahar; most of the soldiers I know understand what's at stake in our fight. Maybe they all haven't verbalized it to the same degree as I just have, but there is a general perception that Canadians don't quite realize just how much is at stake. We fear that they will throw away our gains and sacrifice our future security for immediate comfort and smug self-righteousness. To be honest, that fickleness scares the hell out of us more than the Taliban do.
[edited to rectify some grammar and consolidate two paragraphs that I about before posting]
